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Heisenberg-limited eavesdropping on the continuous-variable
quantum cryptographic protocol with no basis switching is impossible
J. Sudjana, L. Magnin∗, R. Garc´ıa-Patro´n, and N. J. Cerf
QuIC, Ecole Polytechnique, CP 165, Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
(Dated: June 2007)
The Gaussian quantum key distribution protocol based on coherent states and heterodyne detec-
tion [Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 170504 (2004)] has the advantage that no active random basis switching
is needed on the receiver’s side. Its security is, however, not very satisfyingly understood today
because the bounds on the secret key rate that have been derived from Heisenberg relations are
not attained by any known scheme. Here, we address the problem of the optimal Gaussian indi-
vidual attack against this protocol, and derive tight upper bounds on the information accessible to
an eavesdropper. The optical scheme achieving this bound is also exhibited, which concludes the
security analysis of this protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, an important research ef-
fort has been devoted to continuous-variable quantum
key distribution (QKD) protocols, motivated by the
prospects of realizing high-rate cryptosystems relying on
homodyne detection instead of photon counting. These
systems also have the advantage that they are based on
standard (low-cost) telecom optical components, circum-
venting the need for single-photon sources nor single-
photon detectors. In particular, Gaussian QKD proto-
cols have been extensively investigated first because they
are conceptually simpler, but also mainly because their
security can be rigorously assessed. The first proposed
Gaussian QKD protocol used squeezed states of light,
which are modulated in one or the other quadrature (x
or p) by the emitter (Alice), and are measured via ho-
modyne detection by the receiver (Bob) [1]. Although
this protocol is a very natural continuous-variable coun-
terpart of the famous BB84 protocol, its main drawback
is the need for a source of squeezed light.
A second Gaussian QKD protocol was devised,
in which Alice generates coherent states (instead of
squeezed states) which are then modulated both in x
and p, while Bob still performs homodyne detection [2].
Dealing with coherent states of light (simply produced
with a laser) instead of squeezed or single-photon states
makes this protocol very practical. This protocol, sup-
plemented with the technique of reverse reconciliation,
was experimentally demonstrated in Ref. [3], where it
was shown that its range can, in principle, be arbitrar-
ily large. Note that, in these two protocols, Bob ran-
domly chooses to homodyning one quadrature, either x
or p. In the squeezed-state protocol, Bob then needs to
reject the instances where he measured the other quadra-
ture than the one modulated by Alice (this operation is
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called sifting), which results in a decrease of the key rate
by a factor 2 [13]. In the coherent-state protocol, Alice
simply forgets the quadrature that is not measured by
Bob, which may look like a loss of efficiency. A third
Gaussian protocol was therefore proposed, in which Al-
ice still transmits doubly-modulated coherent states but
Bob performs heterodyne measurements, that is, he mea-
sures both quadratures x and p simultaneously [4] (this
possibility was also suggested for postselection-based pro-
tocols in [5]). At first sight, this seems to imply that the
rate is doubled, since Bob then acquires a pair of quadra-
tures (x, p). Actually, since heterodyne measurement ef-
fects one additional unit of vacuum noise on the mea-
sured quadratures, the two quadratures received by Bob
are noisier than the single quadrature in the homodyne-
based protocol. The net effect, however, is generally an
increase of the key rate when the two quadratures are
measured simultaneously [14].
This third protocol thus exhibits two advantages,
namely that (i) the key rate is generally higher than
for the homodyne-based coherent-state protocol, and (ii)
there is no need to choose a random quadrature (i.e.,
no active basis choice is needed) at Bob’s side. How-
ever, in order to make any definite statement on the se-
curity of this protocol, it is necessary to put precise limits
on the maximum information accessible to an eavesdrop-
per (Eve). Surprisingly, although bounds on the opti-
mal Gaussian individual attack against this protocol had
been derived in [4], it has remained unknown until now
whether these bounds can be attained or not by an ex-
plicit eavesdropping strategy. These bounds were derived
using similar techniques to those used for the other Gaus-
sian protocols, namely by writing Heisenberg uncertainty
relations. Since for the protocols based on homodyne
detection, the corresponding Heisenberg bounds can be
attained by use of an explicit transformation (the entan-
gling cloner), it is tempting to conclude that the same
is true for the heterodyne-based protocol. On the other
hand, since no explicit scheme has been found to date
that saturates these bounds, another possibility is that
these are loose, and tighter bounds remain to be found.
2In this paper, we revisit the security of this coherent-
state heterodyne-based Gaussian protocol, and prove
that the second above option is indeed true. We seek
for the optimal Gaussian individual attack by express-
ing the most general symplectic transformation charac-
terizing Eve’s action and maximizing the information ac-
quired by her. Restricting to symplectic transformations
is actually sufficient given that Gaussian attacks are prov-
ably optimal among individual attacks [6]. We conclude
that this optimal attack is less powerful than expected,
in the sense that we derive a tighter bound than that
based on the Heisenberg inequalities. We also exhibit
optical schemes that precisely attain this bound, both
in direct and reverse reconciliation. Hence, the resulting
lower bound on the secret key rate is higher than that
based on the Heisenberg uncertainty relations, making
the heterodyne-based protocol even more efficient than
originally thought.
II. HEISENBERG-LIMITED EAVESDROPPING
The Gaussian protocol based on coherent states and
heterodyne detection [4] can be shown to be equivalent to
an entanglement-based scheme [7], where Alice prepares
an EPR state and applies an heterodyne measurement on
mode A, while Bob applies an heterodyne measurement
on mode B. This is shown in Fig. 1. We restrict our-
selves to individual attacks, where Eve completely con-
trols the Alice-to-Bob channel separately for each trans-
mitted state. Since Gaussian attacks are optimal among
these attacks, we consider in what follows that Eve ef-
fects a Gaussian channel [15]. Consequently, the quan-
tum state ρAB before Alice and Bob’s measurements can
be assumed to be a Gaussian two-mode state with a zero
mean value and a covariance matrix γAB. Usual Gaus-
sian channels, such as optical fibers, effect a symmetric
and uncorrelated noise in both quadratures x and p (in-
cluding, of course, the loss-induced noise), so that we
will only consider symmetric channels without x-p corre-
lations in what follows. Since the EPR state (two-mode
squeezed state) is also symmetric and exhibits no cor-
relations between x and p, we can write the resulting
covariance matrix in a block-diagonal form as
γAB =
(
γxAB 0
0 γpAB
)
(1)
with
γ
x(p)
AB =
(
V ±√T (V 2 − 1)
±
√
T (V 2 − 1) T (V + χ)
)
(2)
where the signs + and − correspond to γxAB and γpAB, re-
spectively. Here, V is the variance of Alice’s output ther-
mal state, while T and χ = (1− T )/T + ǫ are the trans-
mittance and noise referred to the input of the Gaussian
channel [the term (1 − T )/T stands for the loss-induced
vacuum noise, while ǫ is the excess noise referred to the
input].
EPR
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FIG. 1: Entanglement-based scheme of the protocol based
on Alice sending coherent states and Bob applying hetero-
dyne detection. Alice prepares an EPR state and applies het-
erodyne detection on one half of it, resulting in (XMA , P
M
A ),
while the other half is sent to Bob. After transmission via
the channel, Bob performs an heterodyne measurement, re-
sulting in (XMB , P
M
B ). The superscript (0) indicates that the
corresponding state is the vacuum.
In order to address the security of this protocol, we
may, without loss of generality, assume that Eve holds
the purification of the quantum state ρAB. By measuring
their systems, Bob and Eve then project Alice’s share of
the joint pure state |ΨABE〉 onto another pure state[16].
Applying the Heisenberg uncertainty relation on the pure
state held by Alice (conditioning on Bob and Eve’s mea-
surements), we have
VXA|EVPA|B ≥ 1, (3)
where XA and PA are the canonically conjugate quadra-
tures of Alice’s mode and VX|Y is the conditional vari-
ance measuring the remaining uncertainty on X after the
measurement of Y ,
VX|Y = 〈x2〉 −
〈xy〉2
〈y2〉 , (4)
expressed in shot-noise units. Equation (3) also has a
symmetric counterpart that reads,
VPA|EVXA|B ≥ 1. (5)
Since we focus on a symmetric noise in x and p, Eqs. (3)
and (5) can be unified into a single uncertainty relation
VA|EVA|B ≥ 1. (6)
where A stands for any quadrature (XA or PA) of Alice’s
mode. This inequality will be used to put a lower bound
on the uncertainty of Eve’s estimate of the key in Direct
Reconciliation (DR), that is, when the key is made out of
Alice’s data while Bob and Eve compete to estimate it.
Similarly, in Reverse Reconciliation (RR), that is, when
the key is made out of Bob’s data while Alice and Eve
compete to estimate it, one can derive a dual inequality
VB|EVB|A ≥ 1. (7)
where B stands for any quadrature of Bob’s mode. This
will be used to put a lower bound on the uncertainty of
Eve’s estimate of the key in RR.
3Now, we will derive lower bounds on the secret key
rates using the above uncertainty relations on the vari-
ances, similarly as in Ref. [4]. Restricting to individual
attacks and one-way reconciliation, the DR and RR se-
cret key rates for each of the two quadratures read
KDRx or p = H(A
M |E)−H(AM |BM ), (8)
KRRx or p = H(B
M |E)−H(BM |AM ), (9)
where H(.) is the Shannon entropy, and E stands for
Eve’s optimal measurement maximizing her information
(which is not necessarily the same in DR and RR). Note
that we use the variables AM and BM here (not A and
B), since in this protocol Alice and Bob do not measure
one single quadrature but a pair of conjugate quadratures
[AM (BM ) stands for the measurement of one quadrature
of mode A (B), given that the conjugate quadrature is
simultaneously measured]. The total key rates KDR(x,p) or
KRR(x,p) derived later on are the sum of the above expres-
sions for x and p. If we assume that the channel is Gaus-
sian, we can express the conditional entropies in Eqs. (8)
and (9) in terms of conditional variances, so that the
above Heisenberg inequalities on conditional variances di-
rectly translate into bounds on the secret key rates.
A. Direct reconciliation
The problem of estimating Bob’s uncertainty on Alice’s
measurements AM (that is, XMA or P
M
A knowing that the
other one is also measured) can be reduced to estimating
Bob’s uncertainty on each of the quadratures of mode A
(XA, PA) since Alice’s measurements result from mixing
mode A with vacuum on a balanced beam splitter, see
Fig. 1. Using Eqs. (1) and (4), one gets
VA|B =
V χ+ 1
V + χ
(10)
where B stands for the same quadrature of mode B
(XB or PB). Similarly, using Eq. (4), and the fact
that 〈(XMB )2〉 = (1 + 〈(XB)2〉)/2 and 〈XAXMB 〉 =
〈XAXB〉)/
√
2, one gets
VA|BM =
T (V χ+ 1) + V
T (V + χ) + 1
(11)
which can then be converted into the variance of Bob’s
estimate of Alice’s key
VAM |BM =
1
2
[
VA|BM + 1
]
=
1
2
[ (V + 1)(T (χ+ 1) + 1)
T (V + χ) + 1
]
. (12)
Using VA|E = 1/VA|B for the optimal eavesdropping
(since Bob may have performed homodyne detection and
measured one single quadrature), one gets for Eve’s un-
certainty on her estimate of Alice’s key
VAM |E =
1
2
[ 1
VA|B
+ 1
]
=
1
2
[ (V + 1)(χ+ 1)
V χ+ 1
]
(13)
The secret key rate then reads,
KDR(x,p) = log
[
VAM |E
VAM |BM
]
= log
[
(χ+ 1)(T (V + χ) + 1)
(V χ+ 1)(T (χ+ 1) + 1)
]
. (14)
Note that we have a factor two with respect to Eq. (8)
because the key is extracted from both quadratures XMA
and PMA .
B. Reverse reconciliation
Similarly, one can show that VB|A = T (χ + 1/V ) and
VB|AM = T (χ+1), so that the variance of Alice’s estimate
of Bob’s data is
VBM |AM =
1
2
[
VB|AM + 1
]
=
1
2
[
T (χ+ 1) + 1
]
. (15)
while, using VB|E = 1/VB|A (Alice may have performed
homodyne instead of heterodyne detection), one gets for
Eve’s uncertainty
VBM |E =
1
2
[ 1
VB|A
+ 1
]
=
1
2
[T (V χ+ 1) + V
T (V χ+ 1)
]
(16)
The secret key rate then reads,
KRR(x,p) = log
[
VBM |E
VBM |AM
]
= log
[
T (V χ+ 1) + V
T (V χ+ 1)(T (χ+ 1) + 1)
]
. (17)
We have a factor two with respect to Eq. (9) because the
key is extracted from both quadratures XMB and P
M
B .
III. OPTIMAL GAUSSIAN EAVESDROPPING
The entangling cloner, that is, the optimal attack
against the homodyne-based protocols [7], is clearly not
optimal here as it allows to extract information about
one single quadrature. We may think of adapting it by
applying an heterodyne detection on the mode that is
entangled with the mode injected in the line (as well as
on the output mode of Eve’s beamsplitter simulating the
4losses). However, this is equivalent to having a classi-
cal source of noise controlled by Eve, so that the optimal
VA(B)|E that Eve can reach coincides with the beamsplit-
ter attack, which does not saturate (14) nor (17) as the
excess noise ǫ only affects Alice and Bob mutual infor-
mation but does not help Eve to reduce any uncertainty.
Since the time when the heterodyne-based protocol
was introduced [4], no attack has been found saturat-
ing bounds (14) and (17). Logically, two possibilities
remain open: (i) these bounds are tight but the opti-
mal attacks reaching them remain to be found; (ii) these
bound are not tight and the (unknown) optimal attacks
can not saturate them. In order to answer this question,
we need to search for the optimal attack against this pro-
tocol with respect to all possible (individual Gaussian)
attacks that Eve can do. Although we are dealing with
an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, this task remains
tractable because of the fact that Gaussian states and op-
erations have a simple characterization in terms of first-
and second-order moments of the quadratures. We thus
need to find among all possible linear canonical transfor-
mations the one which optimizes Eve’s information either
on Alice’s data (DR) or on Bob’s data (RR). Some sym-
metries also simplify the solution of this problem. Before
searching for the optimal attack, let us consider these
simplifications.
1. Eve’s Gaussian attack and the number of ancillae
As we restrict Eve’s attacks to Gaussian operations,
it is trivial to see that Eve must apply a Gaussian uni-
tary transformation on the mode sent by Alice together
with her ancillae, as shown in Fig. 2. Indeed, applying a
Gaussian completely positive maps instead of a unitary
operation (i.e., discarding some ancillae) can only make
Eve loose information on the secret key. The number of
ancillae that Eve needs is determined as follows. First, it
is easy to see that Eve needs at least two ancillary modes
to estimate either Alice’s (DR) or Bob’s (RR) quadra-
tures, since one is needed to get x, the other to get p. Let
us give an argument why these two ancillary modes are
actually sufficient to implement the optimal attack. In
the entanglement-based description, Eve holds the purifi-
cation of ρAB, and therefore can be restricted to occupy
the same number of modes as ρAB, see [8]. One should
then be able to recover the entanglement-based scheme
of Fig. 2 by applying a local unitary operation on Eve’s
side, since all purifications are equivalent up to a unitary
operation on Eve’s side.
Thus, the optimal Gaussian attack we seek for corre-
sponds, in the Heisenberg picture, to a symplectic trans-
formation S acting jointly on Alice’s mode B0 and Eve’s
ancillary modes E1 and E2, that is
[xˆB , xˆE1 , xˆE2 ,pˆB, pˆE1 , pˆE2 ]
T =
S [xˆB0 , xˆ
(0)
E1
, xˆ
(0)
E2
, pˆB0 , pˆ
(0)
E1
, pˆ
(0)
E2
]T , (18)
X B
PB
EPR
AX
1E
2E
PE2
XE1 Bob
M
M
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Alice
AP
M
M
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BE
A 0B B
FIG. 2: Eve’s attack against the protocol based on Alice send-
ing coherent states and Bob applying heterodyne detection.
Eve performs a unitary operation on her two ancillae E1 and
E2 together with the mode B0 sent by Alice. She then mea-
sures x on one ancilla and p on the other one, in order to
estimate simultaneously the two conjugate quadratures of Al-
ice (DR) or Bob (RR).
where the superscript (0) is used to indicate that the
corresponding state is the vacuum. Then, Eve’s opti-
mal measurement on her two modes E ≡ E1E2 can be
assumed to be a homodyne measurement on these two
modes in order to estimate either (xA, pA) in DR or
(xB , pB) in RR.
2. Symmetric channel without x-p correlations
The symplectic transformation S can be written with-
out loss of generality in a bloc-diagonal form as
S =
(
Sx 0
0 Sp
)
(19)
where Sx and Sp are related by the relation
Sp = (S
T
x )
−1 (20)
in order to preserve the canonical commutation relations.
Indeed, we start with an initial Gaussian state of covari-
ance matrix γAB0 ⊕ 1E1E2 , which is of the same form
as Eq. (1). More precisely, it is symmetric in x and p
and admits no correlations between x and p. After Eve’s
Gaussian operation, we have a Gaussian state for modes
A and B, which, by Schmidt decomposition, can be pu-
rified into a Gaussian 4-mode state by extending the sys-
tem with modes E1 and E2 [8]. This can be understood
by applying a symplectic decomposition on modes A and
B that converts their joint state into a product of two
thermal states. These thermal states can then be writ-
ten as the reduction of EPR states, shared with Eve’s
modes E1 and E2. Since this symplectic decomposition
does not mix the x and p quadratures, the covariance ma-
trix of the 4-mode pure state is again of the same form as
Eq. (1). Hence, the symplectic transformation S applied
by the eavesdropper does not mix the x and p quadra-
tures. We would like to stress that this form, Eq. (19),
is not an assumption but rather a simplification origi-
nating from the fact that the channels of interest effect
symmetric uncorrelated noise in x and p, as mentioned
above.
5The entry of the matrix γxAB corresponding to 〈xˆ2B〉 =
T (V +χ) provides constraints on the first row of Sx, since
we need to have
xˆB =
√
T (xˆB0 +
√
χ cos θ xˆ
(0)
E1
+
√
χ sin θ xˆ
(0)
E2
) (21)
where θ ∈ [0, 2π] is a free parameter. Remember that
〈xˆ2B0〉 = 〈xˆ2A〉 = V . Thus, we can write Sx in general as
Sx =
√
T

 1 √χ cos θ √χ sin θa b c
r s t

 (22)
where {a, b, c, r, s, t} ∈ R are six other free parameters.
Using Equation (20), we can rewrite Sp as
Sp =
1
d
√
T
×


bt− cs cr − at as− br√
χ(s sin θ − t cos θ) t− r√χ sin θ r√χ cos θ − s√
χ(c cos θ − b sin θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r′
a
√
χ sin θ − c︸ ︷︷ ︸
s′
b− a√χ cos θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
t′


(23)
where d = det(Sx). Given the symmetry of the channel,
the entry of γpAB corresponding to 〈pˆ2B〉 = T (V +χ) pro-
vides a constraint on the first row of Sp, in a similar way
as for Sx. This yields the three conditions
bt− cs = d T
cr − at = d T√χ cosφ
as− br = d T√χ sinφ. (24)
where φ ∈ [0, 2π] is a free parameter. Finally, due to the
symmetry of the channel in x and p, we consider that
Eve’s optimal attack gives her the same uncertainty in x
and p.
A. Direct reconciliation
As before, Eve’s uncertainty on Alice’s measurements
AM ≡ (XMA , PMA ) can be calculated from the un-
certainty of Eve on each of the two quadratures of
mode A (XA, PA). We have, for example, VXM
A
|XE1 =
1
2 (VXA|XE1 +1), and similarly for the p quadrature. The
symmetry of Eve’s information on XA and PA imposes
that
VXA|XE1 = VPA|PE2 ≡ VA|E . (25)
Writing the second-order moments of A and E1,
〈xˆ2A〉 = V (26)
〈xˆ2E1〉 = T (a2V + b2 + c2) (27)
〈xˆAxˆE1〉 = a
√
T 〈xˆAxˆB0〉 = a
√
T (V 2 − 1) (28)
and plugging them into Eq. (4), we obtain
VXA|XE1 =
V + a
2
b2+c2
V a
2
b2+c2 + 1
. (29)
Similarly, one has for the p quadrature
VPA|PE2 =
V + r
′2
s′2+t′2
V r
′2
s′2+t′2 + 1
. (30)
Finally, as a consequence of Eq. (25) we can write
VA|E =
V + ρ
V ρ+ 1
, (31)
where
ρ ≡ a
2
b2 + c2
=
r′2
s′2 + t′2
(32)
Given Eq. (21), we see that ρ is proportional to the signal-
to-noise ratio of the Alice-to-Eve channel (more precisely,
the latter signal-to-noise ratio equals ρV ). Thus, by def-
inition, ρ ≥ 0. Moreover, we can write in analogy with
Eq. (3) the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
VXA|XE1VPA|PE2 ≥ 1 (33)
which, together with Eq. (25), implies that VA|E ≥ 1,
or, equivalently, ρ ≤ 1. Note that the Heisenberg-limited
attack in DR corresponds simply to choose ρ = χ.
We will now prove that such a choice is not possible,
that is, it is not consistent with the constraints we have
on the matrices Sx and Sp. In order to further simplify
Sx, we introduce the following change of variables,
a = u
√
ρ
b = u sin ξ
c = u cos ξ (34)
Using the variables r′, s′, t′ as defined in Eq. (23) and the
expression of ρ in terms of these variables, Eq. (32), we
then obtain(
χ− ρ
ρ
)
cos2(ξ + θ) =
(
sin(ξ + θ)−√ρχ
)2
. (35)
Using the symmetry of the channel, Eq. (24), and the
explicit expression of d = detSx, we obtain a second
similar equation(
χ− ρ
ρ
)
cos2(ξ + θ) =
(
sin(ξ + θ) +
1− T
T
√
ρχ
)2
, (36)
Expressing the equality between Eqs. (35) and (36) yields
two solutions. The first one, namely ρχ = −(1 − T )/T ,
is unphysical since T ≤ 1, ρ ≥ 0, and χ ≥ 0. The second
one yields
sin(ξ + θ) =
1
2
Tχρ− (1 − T )
T
√
χρ
. (37)
60 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Channel Losses (dB)
Ke
y 
Ra
te
 (b
its
/pu
lse
)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Channel Losses (dB)
Ke
y 
Ra
te
 (b
its
/pu
lse
)
FIG. 3: Secret key rate as a function of the line losses for
the optimal (solid line) and Heisenberg-limited (dashed line)
attack. The curves are plotted for experimentally realistic
values, V = 12 and ǫ = 0.01, in direct reconciliation (left
panel) or reverse reconciliation (right panel).
Furthermore, injecting Eq. (37) into Eq. (36) gives
cos2(ξ + θ) =
(
1
2
Tχρ+ (1 − T )
T
√
χ(χ− ρ)
)2
. (38)
Finally, the relation cos2(ξ+θ)+sin2(ξ+θ) = 1 provides
us with a second-order equation in ρ,
T (Tχ2 + 4)ρ2 − 2χT (T + 1)ρ+ (1− T )2 = 0 (39)
which always admits two solutions for a given channel
(i.e. given parameters T and χ),
ρ± =
χT (T + 1)± 2
√
T [(Tχ)2 − (1− T )2]
T (Tχ2 + 4)
. (40)
Looking at Eq. (31), we see that minimizing VA|E
is equivalent to maximizing ρ, that is, choosing ρ+.
Thus, Eve’s minimum uncertainty on Alice’s measure-
ment reads,
V minAM |E =
1
2
[
V minA|E + 1
]
=
1
2
(V + 1)(ρ+ + 1)
V ρ+ + 1
(41)
and the lower bound on the DR secret key rate reads
KDR = log
[
V min
AM |E
VAM |BM
]
= log
[
(ρ+ + 1)(T (V + χ) + 1)
(V ρ+ + 1)(T (χ+ 1) + 1)
]
. (42)
Interestingly, Eq. (41) is similar to its counterpart for the
Heisenberg-limited attack, Eq. (13), but with ρ+ replac-
ing χ. It can easily be checked that ρ+ < χ, so that
the highest possible signal-to-noise ratio of the Alice-to-
Eve channel is strictly lower than the one deduced from
Heisenberg uncertainty relations. Hence, Eve’s optimal
attack is less powerful than expected from Heisenberg
relations.
This is illustrated in Fig. 3, where the secret key rates
have been plotted for experimental realistic values of V
and ǫ. The lower bound deduced from the Heisenberg
relations is satisfied, but loose with respect to the actual
key rate.
B. Reverse reconciliation
Combining Eqs. (18) and (22), we obtain the second-
order moments of B and E1
〈xˆ2B〉 = T (V + χ) (43)
〈xˆ2E1〉 = T (a2V + b2 + c2) (44)
〈xˆB xˆE1〉 = T (aV + b
√
χ cos θ + c
√
χ sin θ) (45)
This results in
VXB |XE1 = T
[
b2+c2
a2
+ χ− 2
√
χ
a
(b cos θ + c sin θ)
]
V + χ
a2
(b sin θ − c cos θ)2
V + b
2+c2
a2
. (46)
where we have used Eq. (4). Similarly, using the symmetry of the channel, Eq. (24), we can write,
VPB |PE2 = T
[
s′2+t′2
r′2
+ χ− 2
√
χ
r′
(s′ cosφ+ t′ sinφ)
]
V + χ
r′2
(s′ sinφ− t′ cosφ)2
V + s
′2+t′2
r′2
(47)
Imposing the symmetry of Eve’s information on XB
and PB in analogy with Eq. (25), that is,
VXB |XE1 = VPB |PE2 ≡ VB|E , (48)
gives the three conditions
r′2
s′2 + t′2
=
a2
b2 + c2
= ρ (49)
s′ cosφ+ t′ sinφ
r′
=
b cos θ + c sin θ
a
=
sin(ξ + θ)√
ρ
(50)
s′ sinφ− t′ cosφ
r′
=
b sin θ − c cos θ
a
=
cos(ξ + θ)√
ρ
(51)
7Note that condition (49) is exactly the same as in direct
reconciliation. Surprisingly, it so happens that this con-
dition is sufficient to find an expression for VB|E which
is the same as in direct reconciliation, making it unnec-
essary to use the other two conditions. Indeed, Eve’s
uncertainty on the quadratures of mode B can be rewrit-
ten as
VB|E = T
[
1 + χρ− 2√χρ sin(ξ + θ)]V + χ cos2(ξ + θ)
V ρ+ 1
.
(52)
Then, using the definition of sin(ξ + θ) coming from
Eq. (37) as well as Eq. (39), we obtain
cos2(ξ + θ) =
ρ
Tχ
(53)
1 + χρ− 2√χρ sin(ξ + θ) = 1/T (54)
which gives VB|E = VA|E . Therefore, just like in direct
reconciliation, Eve’s uncertainty on the quadratures of
mode B is minimized by choosing ρ+,
V minB|E =
V + ρ+
V ρ+ + 1
. (55)
Then, Eve’s uncertainty on Bob’s measured values be-
comes
V minBM |E =
1
2
[
V minB|E + 1
]
=
1
2
(V + 1)(ρ+ + 1)
V ρ+ + 1
, (56)
so that the RR secret key rate reads
KRR = log
[
V min
BM |E
VBM |AM
]
= log
[
(V + 1)(ρ+ + 1)
(V ρ+ + 1)(T (χ+ 1) + 1)
]
. (57)
This rate is illustrated in Fig. 3, where it is compared
with the lower bound deduced from the Heisenberg re-
lations in RR. We conclude again that the Heisenberg-
limited attack is not reachable.
For illustration, we compare in Fig. 4 the secret key
rate of the coherent-state homodyne-based protocol to
that of the present coherent-state heterodyne-based pro-
tocol in direct and reverse reconciliation [Eqs. (42) and
(57)]. For realistic parameters V and ǫ, we notice that
the heterodyne-based protocol always yields higher rates
than the homodyne-based protocol in RR. This also
means that the maximum tolerable excess noise ǫ in RR
is higher with the heterodyne-based protocol regardless
the losses. In DR, the heterodyne-based protocol gives
an advantage over the homodyne-based protocol only for
line losses below some threshold. This threshold can be
shown to decrease for increasing ǫ, so that the maximum
tolerable noise is actually higher for the homodyne-based
protocol in DR.
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FIG. 4: Secret key rate as a function of the line losses for the
heterodyne-based (solid line) and homodyne-based (dashed
line) protocols in direct reconciliation (left panel) or reverse
reconciliation (right panel). We use experimentally realistic
values, V = 12 and ǫ = 0.01, and consider that Alice sends
coherent states in both cases.
IV. OPTICAL SETUP ACHIEVING THE BEST
GAUSSIAN ATTACK
In Section III, we have reduced the problem of maxi-
mizing Eve’s information to that of optimizing a single
parameter ρ, the other parameters remaining free. This
implies that the optical implementation of the best Gaus-
sian attack is not unique. In this Section, we present two
particularly interesting examples of such an optical im-
plementation, namely the teleportation attack and the
“feed-forward” attack. Note that the latter attack was
also considered in Ref. [4], where it was noticed that it
curiously does not reach the Heisenberg limit.
A. Teleportation attack
The teleportation attack consists in Eve applying a
continuous-variable quantum teleportation where the in-
put is Alice’s outgoing mode and the output is given to
Bob, as shown in Fig. 5. Eve extracts information from
the outcomes (XME , P
M
E ) of her Bell measurement per-
formed on Alice’s outgoing mode B0 together with one
of the modes (E′1) of an EPR state. It is easy to see
that there are two limiting cases. If the squeezing fac-
tor r of the EPR pair is zero, implying that E′1 is in
a vacuum state, then the scheme becomes equivalent to
an heterodyne measurement of B0 by Eve followed by
the classical preparation of a coherent state (the vacuum
state in mode E′2 which is displaced by some amount de-
pending on XME and P
M
E ). This situation corresponds to
an entanglement-breaking channel giving no secret key.
On the contrary, if the squeezing factor r is infinite, the
teleportation succeeds perfectly and Eve gets no informa-
tion at all due to the infinite noise in the thermal state
E′1. This situation corresponds to a perfect channel with
no losses and no excess noise (T = 1, ǫ = 0). We will
now show that for any intermediate value of r, such a
teleportation attack can be made optimal.
Since all the involved canonical transformations are
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FIG. 5: Teleportation attack against the (entanglement-based
scheme of the) Gaussian protocol based on Alice sending co-
herent states and Bob applying heterodyne detection. Eve
first generates an EPR pair (E′1, E
′
2) by mixing a x-squeezed
vacuum state (E2) with a p-squeezed vacuum state (E1) at a
balanced beamsplitter. Then, she performs a Bell measure-
ment on Alice’s outgoing mode B0 together with E
′
1. Depend-
ing on the measurement outcome and the fixed gain gE, she
then displaces mode E′2 by x (Dx) and p (Dp). The result-
ing state is sent to Bob. By tuning the squeezing parameter
r and the gain gE, Eve can simulate any Gaussian channel
(T, χ) and extract the optimal amount of information.
symmetric in x and p, we will detail the proof for the
x quadrature only. Eve starts by preparing two squeezed
vacuum states, one in mode E2 (squeezed in x) and the
other is mode E1 (squeezed in p),
xˆ1 = e
rxˆ
(0)
1 (58)
xˆ2 = e
−rxˆ(0)2 , (59)
and mixes them on a balanced beamsplitter, thereby gen-
erating an EPR state
xˆ′1 = [e
rxˆ
(0)
1 + e
−rxˆ(0)2 ]/
√
2 (60)
xˆ′2 = [e
rxˆ
(0)
1 − e−rxˆ(0)2 ]/
√
2. (61)
Eve then applies a Bell measurement by mixing E′1 and
B0 on a balanced beamsplitter, and measuring x on one
output and p on the other,
xˆEM =
1√
2
[xˆB0 + xˆ
′
1] =
1√
2
xˆB0 +
1
2
[erxˆ
(0)
1 + e
−rxˆ(0)2 ].
(62)
Next, Eve displaces her mode E′2 by an amount propor-
tional to the measurement outcome XME (multiplied by
the classical gain gE) and sends it to Bob, giving
xˆB = xˆ
′
2 + gE xˆEM
=
gE√
2
xˆB0 +
er√
2
[
1 +
gE√
2
]
xˆ
(0)
1 +
e−r√
2
[
1− gE√
2
]
xˆ
(0)
2 .
(63)
In order to comply with 〈xˆ2B〉 = T (V +χ), we need to fix
gE and r in such a way that
gE =
√
2T (64)
Tχ = (1 + T ) cosh2r + 2
√
T sinh 2r. (65)
1. Direct reconciliation.
Writing the second-order moments of xˆA and xˆE ,
namely
〈xˆ2A〉 = V (66)
〈xˆ2E〉 = (V + cosh 2r)/2 (67)
〈xˆAxˆE〉 = 〈xˆAxˆB0〉/
√
2 =
√
(V 2 − 1)/2 (68)
one can show, using Eq. (4), that Eve’s uncertainty on
Alice’s data is
VA|E =
V cosh 2r + 1
V + cosh 2r
. (69)
By choosing
ρ =
1
cosh 2r
(70)
this expression for VA|E coincides with Eq. (31). Com-
bining Eq. (65) with the relation cosh2 2r− sinh2 2r = 1,
we see that ρ must satisfy the second-order polynomial
equation (39), whose solution gives the value of ρ that
optimizes Eve’s information. Equation (39) having two
possible solutions ρ± generating the same quantum chan-
nel (T, χ), we then have two possible solutions for the
squeezing parameter r. Looking at Eq. (70), we see that
that the squeezing parameter corresponding to the opti-
mal choice ρ+ is the lowest of the two solutions since it
corresponds to the minimum added noise on Eve’s mea-
surement.
2. Reverse reconciliation.
Using Eqs. (4), (65), (67), and
〈xˆB xˆE〉 = 1√
2
[
V
√
T + sinh 2r +
√
T cosh 2r
]
, (71)
one can show that Eve’s uncertainty on each of Bob’s
quadratures reads
VB|E =
V cosh 2r + 1
V + cosh 2r
= VA|E , (72)
implying that the teleportation attack is also optimal
(choosing the lowest squeezing parameter) for the reverse
reconciliation protocol.
B. Feed-forward attack
In the case of a noisy channels with no losses (T = 1)
and direct reconciliation, Eve’s optimal teleportation at-
tack is exactly the same scheme as the one proposed
in Ref. [9] to reach an optimal tradeoff between distur-
bance and state estimation for coherent states (when
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FIG. 6: Entanglement based scheme of Eve “feed-forward” at-
tack over the protocol based on Alice sending coherent states
and Bob applying heterodyne detection. Eve extract part of
the signal sent by Alice using a beamsplitter (transmittance
G) and applies en heterodyne detection on it. Depending
on the measurement result times a given fixed gain gE Eve
displaces mode E′2 over x (Dx) and p (Dp). The resulting
state is then sent to Bob. By tuning the transmittance of
the beamsplitter (G) and the gain (gE) Eve can simulate any
Gaussian channel (T, χ) and extract the optimal amount of
information.
the success of both processes is measured using the fi-
delity). This is not surprising since optimally estimat-
ing the coherent state sent by Alice while minimizing
its disturbance is exactly what Eve attempts to achieve
in her optimal attack in direct reconciliation. In Ref. [9],
two alternative schemes to the teleportation reaching the
same optimal tradeoff were also presented, the “feed-
forward” attack and the asymmetric cloning machine.
Those two schemes can very naturally be extended to
our case (T ≤ 1) if we allow for different mean values
for the input and output modes, which gives rise to new
optical schemes for the optimal attack.
For example, it can be checked that Eve can realize
an optimal attack (both in DR and RR) using the “feed-
forward” scheme described in Fig. 6 by fixing the pa-
rameters of the beamsplitter transmittance G and the
feed-forward gain gE as
G =
1− ρ+
1 + ρ+
(73)
gE =
(√
T −
√
G
)√ 2
1−G. (74)
V. CONCLUSION
We have revisited the security of the Gaussian quan-
tum cryptographic protocol with no basis switching (with
Alice sending coherent states and Bob performing het-
erodyne measurements) introduced in Ref. [4]. We have
considered the most general Gaussian individual attack
against this protocol by characterizing an arbitrary sym-
plectic transformation and maximizing Eve’s information
over all such transformations. We have found that, in
contrast with all other Gaussian protocols that had been
studied so far, no attack exists that attains the security
bounds deduced from the Heisenberg uncertainty rela-
tions, making these bounds unreachable in the present
case. A tight bound was derived, both in direct and re-
verse reconciliation, and several explicit optical schemes
that attain this bound have been exhibited. Remarkably,
this makes the coherent-state heterodyne-based Gaussian
protocol better than what was implicitly assumed in the
original analysis [4].
We may wonder what is so special about this no-
switching protocol? As a matter of fact, in the two
Gaussian protocols based on homodyne detection, one
of the two quadratures plays a special role, namely the
one that is measured by Bob (provided, in the squeezed-
state protocol, that it is also the one modulated by Al-
ice; otherwise the instance is discarded). The Heisen-
berg uncertainty relations then express that any action
on this quadrature, which carries the key, translates into
some additional noise on the dual quadrature. Monitor-
ing the noise on this dual quadrature then puts an upper
limit on the information potentially acquired by Eve on
the key-carrying quadrature. This simple and very intu-
itive interpretation fails for the heterodyne-based proto-
col because then both quadratures must be treated to-
gether (Alice modulates both quadratures and Bob mea-
sures both quadratures). The security can be viewed as
resulting from kind of an information conservation law
through a “fan-out” channel (leading to both Bob and
Eve), akin to what is observed in the optimal estimation-
vs-disturbance tradeoff for coherent states [9] or in the
asymmetric Gaussian cloning of coherent states [10].
We acknowledge financial support from the EU under
projects COVAQIAL and SECOQC, and from the IUAP
programme of the Belgian government under the project
PHOTONICS@BE. R.G.-P. acknowledges support from the
Belgian foundation FRIA.
Note added: The findings of this paper have also been
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